Taking stock: Bipartisan support for clean firm energy endures in an era of federal policy uncertainty

The first year of the second Trump administration was marked by substantial efforts to unwind federal clean energy and climate policy, even as the administration declared an energy emergency on its first day in office and indicated a focus on advancing clean firm technologies in its inaugural Earth Day message. The administration has also signaled again its desire to slash funding at agencies essential for implementing energy and climate policy in this year’s presidential budget request. Billions of dollars in previously awarded funding have been canceled, regulations have been rolled back, and clean energy industries and projects – particularly wind, solar, electric vehicles, hydrogen, and building decarbonization projects – have been explicitly targeted through legislative and administrative actions. Yet focusing only on 2025’s disruptions distorts a more complex story. A broader look at federal action since 2020 reveals the resilience of some parts of bipartisan clean energy policy, especially clean firm electricity generation.

Over the past five years, Congress enacted three major bipartisan energy and climate authorizing laws – the Energy Act of 2020, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and the CHIPS and Science Act – alongside the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which was passed through the filibuster-evading process known as budget reconciliation. Together, these four measures created a strong statutory foundation for clean energy innovation, deployment, and emissions reduction. While the Biden administration only partially implemented these laws before leaving office, large portions of their authorizing text remain intact today.

The second Trump administration’s flagship legislative achievement, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), rolled back significant elements of the IRA, particularly provisions that benefited wind, solar, electric vehicles, and building efficiency. But it did not entirely dismantle clean energy incentives: credits for nuclear fission, fusion energy, geothermal energy, carbon capture, and advanced manufacturing survived. In the case of carbon capture, the incentive provided additional value for carbon utilization. Based on an internal analysis of estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation, CATF estimates that roughly 60% of the estimated value of clean energy tax credits remains after OBBBA, amounting to approximately $280 billion through 2034.¹

Congress provided a partial counterweight during the first full year of the annual appropriations process in the Trump administration. While the administration’s Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) budget request proposed slashing key federal agencies and subagencies focused on energy and climate, bipartisan appropriators rejected many proposed reductions. Department of Energy (DOE) funding declined modestly from Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25) to FY26, but not nearly to the extent sought by the White House; the Nuclear Office, which supports clean firm electricity generation, saw a year-over-year funding increase of $100 million. To achieve this compromise, lawmakers reprogrammed more than $5 billion in previously enacted IIJA funds.²

A further test awaits Congress in the months ahead as it evaluates the President’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2027 (FY27). Despite the bipartisan correction to the FY26 budget request, the recently-published FY27 budget request again proposes significant cuts to existing bipartisan priorities. The FY27 budget request proposes repurposing previously appropriated IIJA funds for “baseload power”³ and funding several new energy offices: an Office of Artificial Intelligence and Quantum, an Office of Fusion, and an Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation.⁴ The FY27 budget request does not include an ask for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the Grid Deployment Office, or the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (some of these Office’s functions have been reallocated under the Department’s reorganization).

Federal hiring surged in the latter half of the Biden administration to carry out programs in IRA and IIJA, but the Trump administration has since reduced the federal workforce, especially for areas with significant technical expertise: more than 10,000 STEM PhDs have left the federal government, disproportionately impacting agencies central to implementing climate and energy policy.⁵ These workforce losses have materially weakened state capacity and may threaten a future administration’s ability to implement ambitious clean energy and climate programs.

At the same time, billions of dollars previously appropriated have already been obligated and spent. From 2021 through 2025, DOE obligated roughly $35 billion in clean energy funding and outlaid nearly $12 billion, supporting (among other technologies) advanced nuclear energy, fusion energy, grid modernization, and carbon management.⁶ These investments cannot easily be reversed and will continue to shape the energy system in the years ahead. Meanwhile, at the renamed Energy Dominance Financing Office, some loans initiated in the Biden-era proceed, including loans that support a nuclear facility restart and a transmission line.⁷

Taken together, the last five years point to a central conclusion: U.S. clean energy policy is less stable and more uncertain today than in the recent past, but bipartisan congressional support for clean firm energy has proven durable and has strong statutory foundations. Whether these tools deliver meaningful emissions reductions depends on whether bipartisan federal policymakers choose to implement, defend, and build upon their past work. The latest disruptions to global oil and gas markets, unfolding now due to the U.S. war against Iran, may further encourage congressional support for clean firm energy sources as global fossil energy price spikes threaten the domestic economy.

For further detail, see our white paper, “Taking Stock of U.S. Energy and Climate Policy Since 2020.”

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Footnotes

1. CATF analysis of Joint Committee on Taxation publications JCX-18.22, JCX-7-23, and JCX-35.25. Available at https://www.jct.gov/publications/2022/jcx-18-22/, https://www.jct.gov/publications/2023/jcx-7-23/, and https://www.jct.gov/publications/2025/jcx-35-25/.
2. Section 311 of the FY26 E&W bill reprograms more than $5 billion from previously enacted IIJA funds.
3. The administration’s budget request for baseload power would provide funds to preserve 9 gigawatts and add 5 gigawatts of coal and natural gas power, uprate nuclear energy, expand supply chain testing for cybersecurity vulnerabilities, reconductor existing transmission lines with advanced conductors, and uprate federal hydropower projects. Department of Energy FY27 Congressional Justification Budget in Brief at 50. Available at: DOE FY 2027 Budget in Brief.
4. Appendix to the Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 2027, at 382-411.
5. Science, U.S. Government has lost more than 10,000 STEM PhDs since Trump took office, January 26, 2026. Available at: U.S. government has lost more than 10,000 STEM Ph.D.s since Trump took office | Science | AAAS.
6. Based on CATF analysis of USASpending.gov data.
7. Jake Bittle, This $400B Biden climate programs is surviving the Trump administration, March 23, 2026.Available at: This $400B Biden climate program is surviving Donald Trump | Grist.