Strategy at the Geopolitical Crossroads: The Imperative for Secure and Clean Energy in Central and Eastern Europe
Executive Summary
The geopolitical restructuring triggered by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has positioned Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at the core of Europe’s energy security reassessment—including the climate-driven transition toward clean energy systems. The region serves as a critical geopolitical zone and corridor connecting Western Europe, the Black Sea, and the post-Soviet space, managing a complex equilibrium among energy diversification, geopolitical alliances, and industrial modernisation. The disruption of traditional energy dependencies has revealed CEE’s vulnerabilities while simultaneously establishing it as a strategic focal point for the European Union’s (EU) decarbonisation objectives and its wider global impact, including the economic reorientation required by climate goals and the industrial opportunities emerging from the clean energy transition.
The competition among great powers is transforming energy geopolitics throughout the region. As Russia’s diminishing energy influence has disrupted, to some extent, EU’s unity regarding supply stability, China’s supremacy in clean energy supply chains introduces a distinct form of strategic reliance risk. Simultaneously, conflicting policy signals from Brussels and Washington—including clean energy subsidies, tariffs, and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports—complicate the region’s alignment. CEE countries are navigating conflicting economic and political paradigms, with some lured by immediate cost-effectiveness at the expense of long-term energy autonomy and climate action benefits, which are increasingly tied to competitiveness in the emerging low-carbon economy.
To maintain cohesion and strategic independence, given the economic benefits of decarbonisation, CEE nations must promote a collaborative regional vision rooted in clean energy infrastructure, industrial capability, and strategic regional foresight. This involves enhancing energy connectivity within current EU borders, as well as with prospective EU members (Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans), bolstering domestic production of clean technologies to diminish dependence on external entities, and investing in varied low-carbon energy systems, including nuclear (both utility-scale and small modular reactors ), and future-proof technologies such as geothermal, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). These initiatives must be underpinned by a coherent public narrative that highlights sovereignty, stability, and enduring competitiveness, rather than externally mandated climate responsibilities, as the public’s support will be critical to a successful transition process.
The clean energy transition in Central and Eastern Europe is fundamentally a geopolitical necessity, rather than merely a technological or economic undertaking. By designing long-term scenario planning, aligning national interests with EU-wide industrial and energy strategies, and mitigating geopolitical dependence on authoritarian energy exporters, the CEE region can convert existing vulnerabilities into strategic assets. This will strengthen its own agency and enhance the EU’s collective geopolitical power within a swiftly changing global energy landscape.
In this geopolitical context, these are the main policy directions for Central and Eastern Europe’s Energy Transition:
- Adopt a technology-neutral transition: Scale proven low-carbon technologies (nuclear, wind, solar, hydro) while diversifying into emerging options (geothermal, carbon capture and storage). Avoid technological lock-in and reassess public subsidies to prioritise affordability and innovation.
- Reduce fossil fuel dependence strategically: For short-term needs, utilise regional resources (e.g., Romania’s gas reserves) and secure short-term LNG imports without undermining long-term decarbonisation goals, while ensuring methane emission standards. Avoid lock-in effects that could delay climate action and increase adaptation costs.
- Strengthen regional cooperation: Expand cross-border energy infrastructure, accelerate grid investments, and coordinate planning with Ukraine, Moldova, and Western Balkan states to enhance energy resilience and EU market integration.
- Build local clean tech manufacturing: Position CEE as a regional cleantech hub by leveraging skilled labour, attracting foreign investment, and aligning with EU industrial and raw materials strategies.
- Align EU enlargement with transition goals: Design the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans into EU energy systems by linking enlargement funding to infrastructure and industrial modernisation, and support Ukraine’s clean energy reconstruction potential.
- Develop a compelling public narrative: Frame the energy transition as a national security and economic growth imperative—emphasising competitiveness, affordability, and independence—not just a climate or EU compliance issue.
- Institutionalise strategic foresight: Embed scenario planning into national strategies to anticipate geopolitical and supply chain disruptions, adapt to evolving EU-U.S.-China dynamics, and increase policymaking capacity to respond to a volatile energy landscape.
1. Introduction
he Central and Eastern European (CEE) region has emerged as a key strategic area in global energy geopolitics, where security, economic resilience, and climate ambitions collide. The war in Ukraine fundamentally disrupted Europe’s energy landscape, forcing a rapid transition away from Russian fossil fuels while exposing the region’s deep vulnerabilities in energy security, supply chains, and infrastructure resilience. Today, Russia, China, the U.S., and especially the European Union (EU) are impacting the region’s energy future, making it crucial to understand the strategic risks and opportunities that lie ahead.
CEE holds a pivotal strategic role for Europe and its surrounding areas, serving as both a geopolitical buffer and an essential connection between the EU and the regions to its east and southeast. The region links Western Europe to the Black Sea, the Western Balkans, and the post-Soviet territory, rendering it essential for commerce, infrastructure, regional stability, and the EU’s overarching geopolitical reach. The expected expansion of the EU in response to emerging security, economic, and political challenges requires further integration and development of Central and Eastern Europe to strengthen EU cohesion, advance democratic values, and enhance the Union’s influence as a global entity in an increasingly complex world.
CEE nations are managing a complex equilibrium among energy diversification, industrial competitiveness, and security issues. In some cases, the EU’s pursuit of complete decoupling from Russian energy may be impeded by economic realities and political divisions. The EU is confronting concurrent difficulties in overseeing China’s involvement in clean energy supply chains while reassessing its relationship with its traditional ally, the United States. The convergence of great-power rivalry, energy policy, and security threats significantly impacts the stability of Central and Eastern Europe.
In specific circumstances, choosing an alternative energy route may seem a cautious economic choice, particularly in the short term. The United States aims to enhance its energy exports to the EU, frequently within the framework of extensive trade negotiations concerning tariff reductions, which may lure certain CEE nations due to the current relatively attractive price of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG). Constrained by tight national budgets and escalating demands for defence and infrastructure expenditures—prompted by obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU mandates—these governments may be compelled to diminish their clean energy aspirations. Although this may appear to be a pragmatic reaction to urgent financial constraints, decreasing clean technology advancement would constitute a considerable strategic setback. It risks deepening long-term dependence on fossil fuel imports and leaves these countries vulnerable to the volatility of global commodity markets.
The recent EU Clean Industrial Deal seeks to establish European leadership in various industrial sectors, yet its success is contingent upon the active participation of Central and Eastern Europe in this framework. The region is not merely an energy consumer; it is a potential centre for clean energy manufacturing, technological advancement, and infrastructure enhancement. The region’s energy transition has made substantial progress recently, particularly influenced by the energy security implications of the war in Ukraine, all while addressing broader security issues and managing affordability. Comprehending these dynamics is essential for guaranteeing that CEE’s energy transition fortifies, rather than undermines, European energy security.
The EU’s enlargement process – while still in very early stages – will further influence these dynamics, as Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans progress toward integration. The eventual accession of Ukraine to the EU and its reconstruction efforts will be a pivotal element in this process. In the phase of reconstruction, the nation possesses the capacity to emerge as a pivotal energy transit hub and a catalyst for industrial and clean energy advancement. Enhancing energy connections between Central and Eastern Europe and these prospective Member States will be crucial for regional energy security, expediting market integration, and diminishing their reliance on external entities such as Russia and China.
The increase in hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, and economic coercion, demands research into energy security and geopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe to formulate policy responses, strategic investments, and resilience-building initiatives.
This report aims to deliver essential insights for navigating the changing geopolitical landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, presenting a strategic framework for comprehending regional risks, recognising opportunities for collaboration, and guiding policies that enhance energy resilience, advance clean technology, foster climate action, enhance economic competitiveness, and ensure long-term stability along the EU’s eastern border and beyond.
2. The impact of the war in Ukraine on CEE’s energy landscape – CEE’s balancing act: diversification vs. competitiveness
Disruption of the Russian fossil fuel supply and the accelerated transition to alternative sources. Short-term and long-term vulnerabilities in energy security and infrastructure.
The first signs of a Russian-directed hybrid conflict involving natural gas emerged in 2021. At that time, approximately 45% of the EU’s pipeline and LNG imports originated from Russia. With the onset of the invasion in February 2022, it became evident that the EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas was a major vulnerability, demanding the identification of both short-term solutions for the 2022-2023 winter and long-term strategies.
While this represented an EU-wide security issue, Member States faced different starting points, defined by their domestic high dependence on Russian gas (as exemplified by Germany), geographical factors and the limited degree of interconnection with adjacent nations (as it is the case of landlocked countries like Czech Republic, Slovakia, or Hungary), or by the risk to their industrial competitiveness (again, as was the case of Germany, a leader in the EU’s industrial sector). Alongside other factors, these revealed the short-term vulnerabilities and limitations of European energy systems and demand.
In this context, 2022 resembled a race against time, as the EU, its Member States, and allies developed energy efficiency measures, mitigated rising energy costs, mandated minimum gas storage levels, and designed the REPowerEU plan, aimed at “phasing out Russian fossil fuel imports.” A considerable portion of the plan’s objectives was ironically enabled by the Russian Federation itself, which progressively diminished natural gas exports to the EU as part of its broader geopolitical strategy.
Complete economic decoupling from Russian energy continues to be a multifaceted and persistent challenge. Despite significant reductions in gas flows, some EU Member States, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, still depend on Russian energy sources for particular sectors or in restricted quantities. In certain instances, Russian nuclear fuel or petroleum products persist within EU supply chains. The current economic conditions have revealed the shortcomings of crisis-induced policy changes and the necessity for more fundamentally rooted diversification strategies.
Despite substantial progress in securing supply and accelerating the energy transition since 2022, aimed at enhancing energy independence through unprecedented renewable deployment, this rapid transition has exposed additional vulnerabilities. On the one hand, the lack of relatively inexpensive Russian natural gas has, in certain instances, resulted in demand decline within the European industrial sector. In contrast, the EU’s industrial competitors enjoy lower energy costs. The United States holds abundant oil and gas resources and is achieving unprecedented production levels—a trend the Trump administration aims to sustain—while also experiencing a surge in renewable energy generation. China continues to use domestic coal while expanding imports of Russia’s price-capped oil. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that in 2023, electricity prices for energy-intensive industries in the EU were twice as high as those in China and the United States, rendearing European competition nearly unfeasible due to elevated production energy costs. At best, the industrial manufacturing sector that demonstrated resilience and resumed operations has still experienced diminished competitiveness in global markets. On the other hand, the aim of rapid clean technology deployment exposed an alternative risk of increased reliance on clean energy supply chains and critical raw materials from China.
In addressing these challenges, the European Commission faced the herculean task of informing EU consumers, both households and industries, and maintaining social and political cohesion in times of crisis, as the 2024 EU elections approached. In the process, the Commission established a few ambitious climate and energy targets, some of which resulted in increased political vulnerabilities.
The role of CEE in shaping the EU’s energy independence strategy
CEE countries have continuously faced diverse energy challenges, managing the energy transition and its related issues through various methods. From the critical issue of securing supply in landlocked nations like Slovakia and Hungary—where energy import routes are limited—to Romania’s diversified electricity production mix. From Greece’s strong renewable energy potential to ongoing fuel poverty in Romania and Bulgaria. Austria’s consistent opposition to nuclear energy contrasts with Romania’s proactive stance on both utility-scale and modular nuclear reactors. Poland continues to struggle with coal phase-out, while Black Sea countries are increasingly exploring offshore gas reserves and wind energy opportunities.
Figure 1. Energy imports dependency rate in 2003 vs. 2023
Consequently, the diverse approaches to the evolving concept of energy security have resulted in significantly different dependencies over the years. In 2023, the dependency rate ranged in CEE countries from 76% in Greece to 4% in Estonia (Figure 1).
A comparison to 2003, disregarding absolute figures and thereby neglecting the overall evolution of energy demand, reveals noteworthy changes in import dependency rates. Latvia and Estonia have successfully reduced their import dependency by 25-30%, whereas their neighbouring country, Lithuania, along with Poland, has significantly underperformed, resulting in a 25-35% increase in energy dependency. These figures illustrate the constraints of universally applicable policy solutions. They also emphasize why regional energy geopolitics are influenced by diverse factors and issues, varying from one nation to another.
In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, CEE faced a substantial energy affordability crisis. The sudden decrease in Russian gas supplies resulted in a significant rise in wholesale energy prices. Countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, encountered significant challenges in substituting this supply in the short term. Additionally, given the limited grid interconnection among CEE countries, the capacity of free market mechanisms to reduce prices shrank. This resulted in increased expenses for both households and industrial consumers, fuelling inflation and inciting public discontent.
Initially, the European Commission and EU Member States chose to protect consumption through lump sum payments, mostly providing untargeted subsidies for consumption. Moreover, some Member States chose to impose windfall taxes, frequently resulting in additional disruptions in wholesale energy markets, and even limiting clean energy developers from investing increased profits in new renewable capacities.
Figure 2. Electricity prices for household consumers, second semester of 2024 (purchasing power standards (PPS) per 100 kWh).
Source: Eurostat
In May 2022, the EU initiated the REPowerEU initiative to diversify energy imports, enhance the deployment of renewable energy, and augment energy efficiency. By the end of 2023, Russian pipeline gas represented less than 15% of the EU’s supply mix, a decrease from 45% in early 2021. Nonetheless, this diversification incurred a cost: LNG imports, especially from the U.S. and Qatar, were considerably more expensive, and displaced rather than solved the energy security issue. Although this enhanced supply security, affordability issues continued to affect Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in countries with constrained fiscal capacity to mitigate price fluctuations via subsidies or social transfers.
Currently, CEE countries have to cope with the cost ramifications of the energy disruption, as well as with the energy transition-associated investments. Recent Eurostat data (Figure 2) regarding the geographical distribution of electricity prices indicates that certain CEE Member States, such as Romania, Slovakia, and Poland, experienced some of the highest retail prices in the EU.
Figure 3. Clean electricity generation by source, 2020 vs. 2023.
Source: Eurostat
Notwithstanding these challenges, CEE countries have demonstrated resilience in recent years. A recent analysis indicates a 25% decline in gas demand across most Central and Eastern European countries. This can be partially attributed to diminished industrial and economic activity, yet it also demonstrates the region’s capacity to adapt to energy security risks. The swift implementation of alternative energy solutions in these countries, recorded over the last years, underscores the urgent necessity to transition away from conventional imported fossil fuels. A comparison between 2020 and 2023 (Figure 3) over clean electricity generation, covering renewable and nuclear capacities, indicates substantial progress for all CEE countries. Although renewable generation depends on seasonal weather conditions, the progression demonstrates the steadfast efforts of these Member States.
However, the transition to clean energy in the CEE region remains constrained by ongoing infrastructure and investment limitations. A significant barrier lies in the limited cross-border electricity transmission capacity, which hinders the integration of regional markets and the management of renewable variability. The underinvestment in clean electricity generation technologies is equally significant. These technologies offer significant potential for energy diversification and decarbonization; however, their implementation is inconsistent due to financial obstacles, regulatory ambiguity, and lengthy permitting procedures. Addressing these deficiencies necessitates a unified European strategy that not only expedites infrastructure development but also guarantees that smaller and more vulnerable economies are not marginalised in the energy transition.
The delicate energy security landscape of recent years and the tense geopolitical context have prompted other accelerated initiatives, including a swift resolution regarding Romania’s offshore gas reserves—previously stalled for years—and an increased focus on nuclear energy in nations such as Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic.
The same energy security context, along with the repercussions of Russian aggression on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, has underscored the region’s limitations, particularly its limited connectivity with Western Europe. This has consistently exerted pressure on regional energy prices, highlighting the necessity for enhanced investments in cross-border capacities to bolster EU-wide energy security and reduce energy bills.
3. Great-Power competition and energy security in the European Union and the CEE
The evolving definition of energy security – new layers and factors influencing it.
In recent years, world governments have encountered difficulties in understanding and balancing the three dimensions of the energy trilemma (energy security, affordability, and sustainability); however, the element that has undergone the most significant transformation is energy security.
For centuries, energy security indicated a nation’s ability to use domestic fossil fuels and water resources to fulfill its internal energy needs (first layer of energy security). Subsequently, primarily in the 20th century, the energy security definition added a second layer denoting nations’ ability to establish and sustain commercial and physical connections with other countries for the import-export of energy resources (fossil fuels) or end energy products (e.g., derivatives of oil and gas, electricity). In this context, global energy trade increased opportunities for enhancing energy security, and unlocking economic growth, but also created conditions for suppliers to wield energy commodities as geopolitical leverage. Consequently, some resource-rich countries were able to engage in energy exports with energy-deficit ones. Over the past two decades, the concept of energy security has undergone a substantial transformation due to the growing integration of renewable generation into the global electricity mix. This third layer of energy security encompasses the intricacies of the availability of critical raw materials, the production of clean technologies, and renewable energy generation.
While numerous historical conflicts have been driven by territorial wealth, current energy geopolitics continuously affect the final two layers of energy security: trade and fossil fuel control by some countries on the one hand, and China’s pre-eminence in critical raw materials extraction, refinement, and clean technology production on the other.
In addition to the three main layers of the energy security definition (Figure 4), multiple clusters of factors also affect the degree of energy security. The ability to reduce or change energy demand patterns to adapt to a more variable energy generation portfolio can serve as a significant mechanism for enhancing energy security, whereas an inflexible energy demand will exacerbate energy security challenges. Trade is a primary concern today, with tariffs impacting various energy markets and supply chains, thereby resulting in decreased energy security for importing nations. The growing threat of hybrid warfare across regions, including cyberthreats to supply disruption and critical infrastructure, has the potential to impact energy security, resulting in prolonged adverse economic consequences. Social and economic factors, along with political elements, have influenced the long-term energy security development process, leading countries to choose various energy policy pathways. For example, prolonged economic challenges, such as high inflation and increased energy bills may be used by opposition parties to argue in favour of keeping unreliable, yet cheaper commodity dependencies, which eventually decrease a state’s energy security conditions. Numerous technical factors can positively or negatively affect energy security, as innovations and research and development can profoundly influence the energy landscape. Ultimately, the ramifications of climate change are profoundly impacting supply security, with water availability emerging as a significant concern over the years, compounded by extreme weather events that jeopardise the resilience of critical energy infrastructure.
Figure 4. Today’s energy security concept (pink marks indicate the influence of geopolitical factors)
Numerous subfactors within the aforementioned clusters are subject to geopolitical influence, resulting in a complex definition of modern energy security.
In this context, although the energy geopolitics of the future are anticipated to be less tense in several decades, due to the localized production of renewable electricity and reduced reliance on energy trading (second energy security layer), the path to this outcome is fraught with numerous geopolitical tensions, linked with critical raw materials mining, refining, and clean technology manufacturing.
The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal, its Affordable Energy Action Plan
As a primary victim of the shifting energy security landscape over the past three years, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy crisis, the European Union needed to develop short-term damage-control measures while simultaneously strategising to diminish its reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Despite the substantial economic challenges encountered in 2022 and 2023, the initiatives undertaken by the European Union and its Member States have largely achieved their goals – diminishing Russian gas imports from 45%, in 2021, to 19%, in 2024 – while maintaining relative social cohesion and political stability within Europe, particularly in anticipation of the 2024 EU elections and the consequential super-election year (roughly half of global citizens casting their votes in 2024). The mid-term commitments to energy independence (e.g., phasing out Russian gas imports by 2027) and certain ambitious targets for 2030 also contributed to the strategy’s success.
With the 2024 EU elections past and the stability of pro-European parties preserved in the EU Parliament, the EU and its Commission had time to address the growing and evident industrial competitiveness challenges of the economic bloc. The already Herculean task has also had to account for the evolving political landscape in the United States. The new Clean Industrial Deal launched in the first 100 days of the new European Commission seeks to realign the EU’s economy to effectively tackle competitiveness shortcomings by addressing systemic, regulatory, and financial factors. The accompanying “Action Plan for Affordable Energy” was designed to lay the foundation for the EU’s energy system for 2030 and beyond. While failing to reassess some of the previously established aspirational targets, the plan included even more ambitious objectives, aiming to increase the EU’s electrification rate by 50% by 2030. This implicitly calls for rapid and substantial investments in transmission and distribution grids, despite the current reality of very high lead times for large power transformers or high/extra-high-voltage lines deployment.
Achieving these goals while “lowering energy costs,” as stated in the Action Plan for Affordable Energy, will once again prove to be ambitious, despite the set of measures proposed by the Commission. Although ambitious objectives might preserve short-term social cohesion, as proven in 2022 and 2023, failing to achieve them will ultimately harm the EU political incumbents in the 2029 EU elections, which come merely six months prior to the 2030 targets deadline.
Although the EU’s broader objectives for 2030 may present a significant chance for CEE member and non-member states, it is essential to recognise the region’s distinct starting conditions, including substantial energy import dependence, moderate electrification rates within the energy mix, limited electricity interconnection with Western nations, landlocked geographical positioning for some countries, and ongoing affordability challenges for political authorities.
Russia’s continued energy leverage. Is there room for Russian pipeline gas to flow again to Europe?
While the EU’s overall dependency on Russian gas has significantly decreased in the last years, with the transit through Ukraine being halted at the beginning of 2025, the Kremlin’s gas continues to flow to some European countries. The EU’s fragmented strategy for phasing out Russian gas intensifies this influence, as some European voices consider resuming Russian supplies, although the EU recently reaffirmed its commitment to fully phase out Russian imports. This divide threatens the EU’s energy security and green transition initiatives, as dependence on less expensive Russian gas may dissuade investments in clean energy. It remains to be determined whether and to what extent Europe will change its current position and revert to Russian gas in a potential post-war era. In both scenarios, CEE’s function will be pivotal in mitigating risk and enhancing energy security throughout the continent.
To address this lingering vulnerability, the European Commission released a comprehensive Roadmap to phase out all remaining imports of Russian natural gas by 2027. The roadmap proposes a stepwise approach: first, prohibiting imports under new contracts and all spot market transactions of Russian gas by the end of 2025; then, banning imports under existing long-term contracts by 2027. This plan is underpinned by recent infrastructure upgrades, including 18 LNG terminals added or expanded since 2022 – including in CEE, in Alexandroupolis (Greece), Krk (Croatia), and Swinoujscie (Poland) – and diversification measures with reliable suppliers such as Norway, the U.S., Qatar, and Azerbaijan. Crucially, the roadmap argues that eliminating Russian gas imports is feasible without jeopardising price stability or security of supply—thanks to accelerated deployment of renewables, the development of alternative gas sources (e.g., Romania’s Neptun Deep), and substantial upcoming additions to global LNG export capacity.
The Commission also intends to implement a legislative framework requiring Member States to submit national phase-out plans for Russian gas as early as the end of 2025. These plans must detail current contractual volumes, identify diversification strategies, and set clear timelines for exit. The EU’s strategy explicitly warns against “swap” arrangements that disguise Russian-origin gas, reaffirming that energy sovereignty and climate commitments must not be compromised by temporary cost advantages. By coordinating actions across the Union, the roadmap seeks to eliminate structural dependencies, reduce Russia’s war revenues, and accelerate the EU’s clean energy transition.
China’s role in clean energy supply chains and critical raw materials
China holds a dominant role in the global supply chains of critical minerals, encompassing the entire value chain, including mining, refining, and the production of clean technology. China is the main manufacturer of clean energy technologies, leading the solar photovoltaic (PV) modules segment and holding a significant share of the global battery cells and electric vehicles market. This vertically integrated dominance—from upstream extraction to downstream clean technology production—gives China substantial geopolitical and financial leverage in the global energy transition.
In response to the escalating geopolitical and supply chain risks linked to its heightened dependence on Chinese clean energy technologies, the EU has initiated a series of policy measures designed to diversify supply sources and enhance domestic capabilities. The Critical Raw Materials Act (2023) establishes ambitious objectives for 2030, while the recent Clean Industrial Deal also prioritises clean technology supply chains moving forward.
The involvement of CEE nations in the energy transition is complicated by Chinese influence on essential global supply chains. Moreover, China’s partnerships in Central and Eastern Europe – with both current (e.g. China’s BYD aiming to establish a European centre in Hungary) and prospective members (e.g. Serbia securing more than $2 billion Chinese investments in renewable energy) of the European Union – signal the strategic importance of the region as a hub for future economic development and logistical outreach for Western Europe.
While both Russia and China exert considerable influence in Europe’s energy and industrial sectors, the characteristics and extent of their impact vary significantly. Russia possesses a well-documented history of employing fossil fuel exports, especially natural gas, as tools of geopolitical coercion, directly affecting European energy security. In contrast, China’s supremacy in clean energy technologies and essential raw materials primarily arises from sustained industrial policy, rather than coercive actions. So far, the leverage it possesses is primarily structural and economic rather than directly political or security oriented.
Consequently, concerns regarding excessive reliance on Chinese technologies—especially in critical sectors such as solar photovoltaic systems, batteries, and smart grid components—have intensified. Recent scrutiny of communication modules integrated into Chinese-manufactured solar inverters has heightened concerns regarding potential cybersecurity threats and foreign interference. These developments highlight the necessity for vigilance and diversification, despite the risks being distinct from those presented by Russia. Understanding this distinction is essential for developing effective, targeted policies that enhance both Europe’s clean energy resilience and its strategic autonomy.
The new U.S. energy policy approach and the challenge for CEE
The current changes in the United States’ energy policy intensify the geopolitical tensions prevalent in today’s world, particularly affecting CEE nations, which are experiencing conflicting objectives, mainly between Brussels and Washington. In a recent statement at the Three Seas Business Forum, in Warsaw, the U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright encouraged CEE EU Member States to adopt the U.S. approach to “energy freedom” rather than comply with “top-down imposition of enforced climate policies.”
In some cases, choosing the alternative route may even be a straightforward, yet short-sighted economic choice. As the U.S. aims to increase its energy exports to the EU, in exchange for tariff relief, certain CEE Member States may find it challenging to ignore relatively affordable U.S. LNG. Current budget constraints and heightened expenditures on defence and infrastructure, as mandated by NATO and the EU, respectively, may compel certain Member States to reduce their energy transition plans. Although this may address immediate economic needs, hindering the advancement of clean technology would constitute a significant error, as it would perpetuate and exacerbate energy dependency, keeping these countries exposed to the high risk of commodity volatility.
Notwithstanding differing perspectives on specific regulatory strategies, viable opportunities for U.S.-CEE collaboration in the energy sector remain evident. Nuclear power and small modular reactors (SMRs) represent a strategic focal point, with the United States at the forefront of innovation and numerous CEE nations indicating interest in utilising nuclear energy as a reliable, low-carbon resource. To this end, while Russia’s share in the nuclear fuel sector cannot be ignored, importing countries (including the U.S.) have proactively started to look into alternative solutions in advance, to avoid any potential shocks in the next years and decades. Moreover, the expected relicensing of existing nuclear power plants in the region will be critical, although countries need to properly plan and avoid any delays in the downtime of these units during the maintenance process. The geothermal potential in Poland, Hungary, and Romania presents significant opportunities for transatlantic collaboration, especially in exploration technology and project financing.
In this changing environment, CEE nations can adopt a more proactive role in energy diplomacy, facilitating the alignment of transatlantic positions where interests converge. By identifying and leveraging the “win-set” between the EU and the U.S.—ranging from advanced nuclear and the transitional role of natural gas to digital grid infrastructure—CEE Member States can promote both convergence and compromise. While explicit consensus may be achievable regarding critical technologies, implicit endorsement may suffice in politically sensitive domains. This intermediary role could substantially improve the region’s strategic position and attract essential investment and political capital from both sides of the Atlantic.
Nonetheless, in light of the escalating tensions between the EU and the U.S., intensified by the ongoing tariff war, a growing rapprochement between Brussels and Beijing seems a potential scenario. The progress towards a more formal partnership and enhanced business relations between the EU and China raises a risk of deteriorating transatlantic relations, as this process will be difficult to reverse, even under subsequent US administrations.
4. The role of the EU’s enlargement process and Ukraine’s reconstruction
The EU’s 2040 climate and energy objectives—especially the expected 90% emissions reduction target—are influenced by both internal industrial and social factors as well as the bloc’s changing borders. The enlargement towards the Western Balkans, Moldova, and Ukraine exhibits a complex duality: a geopolitical necessity heightened by the 2022 energy crisis, coupled with a structural challenge to the EU’s decarbonization timeline. Candidate nations, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, Kosovo (holding ‘potential’ candidate status), and Ukraine begin from different energy baselines—and many remain significantly dependent on fossil fuels and possess aging infrastructure. These discrepancies threaten to widen the internal divide concerning energy transition preparedness, potentially jeopardising the EU’s collective climate objectives unless addressed with a comprehensive and specific strategy.
Although EU accession is a significant political and economic goal for these nations, aligning national energy frameworks with EU regulations—especially concerning carbon pricing, energy market design, or methane regulation—will require considerable institutional and infrastructural reforms. The potential for enhanced market integration and climate alignment is significant; with appropriate support mechanisms, these candidate countries could serve as accelerators rather than impediments to the EU’s long-term energy goals.
The reconstruction of Ukraine post-war, if strategically planned, could provide a model for integrating renewable energy and energy efficiency into national frameworks from the outset. The accelerated integration processes of the EU, partially motivated by geopolitical imperatives, present an opportunity to incorporate sustainability into reconstruction initiatives. Furthermore, the expansive CEE region, encompassing EU Member States bordering Ukraine and Moldova, is poised to gain by establishing itself as a pivotal logistical, technological, and energy corridor. This would not only enhance the incorporation of prospective members into the EU’s decarbonized grid but also reinforce CEE’s position as an energy hub—connecting EU supply chains with potential Eastern partners and beyond.
To achieve this, prioritization of cross-border transmission and essential infrastructure enhancements is imperative. These needs extend beyond new members; they are essential even within existing EU borders. An enhanced EU energy network must be resilient and integrated, able to manage flows across a more diverse and geographically expansive Union. Establishing this infrastructure is essential for Ukraine’s reconstruction and for enhancing regional energy resilience.
In the context of the enlargement process, candidate countries must conform to the EU’s energy market regulations and climate policies, including the emissions trading system (ETS). However, these frameworks may not be adequately tailored to the economic structures of candidate nations. A critical policy challenge will be determining how to implement these mechanisms without hindering economic growth. Misalignment may not only postpone accession but also stir internal disagreements regarding burden-sharing and perceived disparities between existing and newer Member States.
The EU must allocate adequate resources in its forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework to support energy transition initiatives in candidate countries to mitigate these risks. It additionally needs to adapt its governance and institutional frameworks—including decision-making and budgetary regulations—to address the complexities of an “EU30+” configuration. For enlargement to serve as a strategic asset rather than a climate liability, climate diplomacy, energy infrastructure, and market governance must be integrated into the accession process from the beginning, rather than as an afterthought.
5. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The current state of energy geopolitics in CEE is precarious due to a complex array of factors, with the primary cause being the EU’s reliance on external fossil fuels. Excessive dependence on relatively inexpensive Russian natural gas and coal has heightened the risks to the economic bloc’s supply security over the years.
Considering last years’ factors, the shift from fossil fuels continues to be the most viable strategy for guaranteeing long-term energy security within EU borders. Nevertheless, since short-term energy security relies on the accessibility of affordable and reliable natural gas suppliers, particularly for heating requirements and balancing variable renewable electricity, the use of natural gas and its eventual gradual removal must be thoroughly strategized. First, the CEE should utilise all available regional resources to guarantee its short-term security of supply, such as existing reserves in Romania. Second, while short-term imports of natural gas from the United States, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates or other reliable suppliers are necessary, the EU’s agreements for securing this resource must not jeopardise its decarbonisation objectives. Although achieving this is challenging given the current budgetary constraints of most Member States, the alternative of locking in natural gas would perpetuate the continent’s reliance on external suppliers and global markets’ volatility, and accelerate the effects of climate change, leading to higher adaptation costs. Third, if a new pipeline agreement between the EU and Russia is inevitable due to political pressures from certain Member States, influenced by their domestic social and economic contexts, Ukraine must retain the autonomy to determine the terms of this transit contract and maximize its benefits from the prospective agreement.
Notwithstanding these immediate requirements, a rapid and systematic energy transition underpinned by various clean technologies should be accelerated. In doing so, the European Union must minimise further dependencies on critical raw materials and clean technology, aligning its decarbonisation strategies with the industrial reconfiguration and revival of European companies.
To further the aforementioned objectives, while navigating the intricate context of energy geopolitics, a series of actions is appropriate for CEE:
1. Strengthening regional energy cooperation and integration
To improve resilience and reduce external dependencies, CEE countries should deepen cross-border energy cooperation, which includes coordinating infrastructure development (e.g., electricity interconnections such as the Green Corridor, hydrogen corridors). Similarly, the acceleration and increased investment in grids for allowing a fast-paced electrification process (on both supply and demand sides) will be essential.
To this end, engaging in joint grid planning with Ukraine, Moldova, and Western Balkan candidates to support EU market integration and an increased energy security level will prove key for the region’s long-term stability.
Equally important to this objective will also be to assess the role of gas for CEE in the short term and prepare long-term reduction plans. Strategy analysis should consider existing natural gas resources and import alternatives.
Lastly, developing well-planned strategies for strategic storage and procurement of critical minerals will also serve the energy transition process.
2. Embrace technology-neutral approaches with diverse low-carbon options
While it is important to assess how investments ought to be prioritised, instead of betting on single technologies, CEE countries should scale proven low-carbon assets such as nuclear, offshore and onshore wind, solar, and hydropower where possible. Nevertheless, given ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Black Sea, additional offshore wind energy generation may only increase these tensions.
Although Central and Eastern Europe holds significant renewable energy potential—especially in onshore wind, solar photovoltaic, and hydropower—these resources alone cannot ensure consistent energy reliability throughout the year. The region’s energy transition must incorporate “clean firm” technologies, such as nuclear and advanced geothermal which can deliver reliable, dispatchable power regardless of whether variability or seasonal changes. Clean firm power is essential for maintaining balance, particularly as the integration of renewables rises and grid systems face heightened stress due to variability. In the absence of robust low-carbon generation, excessive dependence on renewables and battery storage may result in energy security vulnerabilities and increased system expenses. Nuclear energy—encompassing both utility-scale and small modular reactors—ought to be regarded not as a substitute for renewables, but as a complementary solution that enhances system reliability, expedites decarbonization, and maintains strategic flexibility.
CEE member states need to also objectively reassess the need for subsidies for specific technologies and redistribute public support towards other emerging technologies (e.g. lower the household PVs support and redirect it towards household-level storage solutions). In this context, considering social and economic criteria for subsidies granting to address affordability issues will be an essential step in gaining wide public support for the energy transition process.
At the same time, the CEE region needs to maintain optionality to avoid future technological lock-in or external dependencies (be they on conventional fuels or critical raw materials), while also actively assessing emerging technology options, like advanced geothermal, carbon capture and storage for future-proofing CEE’s industrial base and analyzing realistic deployment targets and utilization for clean hydrogen.
3. Leverage and localise clean technology manufacturing
Given China’s dominance in clean tech supply chains and increasing EU-U.S. tensions, CEE can position itself as a cleantech manufacturing hub (solar, wind components, grid tech), and a value chain re-shoring destination aligned with the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and Clean Industrial Deal (leveraging on high-skills/relatively low wages).
For instance, in the face of escalating geopolitical uncertainties, particularly due to a fragmented U.S. policy environment and Russia’s ongoing use of energy as a weapon, Central and Eastern European nations must actively establish a localised and diversified nuclear supply chain. Strategic alliances with competent and politically aligned nations, may provide Central and Eastern European countries with reliable technology transfers, financing, and fuel cycle services. These alliances not only alleviate geopolitical risk but also bolster the region’s aspirations to establish itself as a clean energy manufacturing center in accordance with the EU’s Clean Industrial Deal.
4. Align enlargement with energy transition/reindustrialisation objectives
As Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans progress towards EU accession, CEE countries should lead the integration of these nations into the European energy market. Moreover, considering the pressing necessity for Ukraine’s reconstruction, fostering the nation’s growth as a transit and production centre for certain clean energy technologies, in collaboration with neighbouring countries, may serve as an economically viable choice for the region’s energy sector. Finally, CEE members of the EU must encourage EU funding and institutional assistance that aligns enlargement with infrastructure and decarbonisation objectives, as well as with comprehensive reindustrialisation strategies across the EU.
5. Develop a unified strategic narrative for public support
Defining the circumstances of energy geopolitics and the necessity for Central and Eastern Europe’s energy transition efforts is essential. Consequently, CEE governments must present the energy transition not solely as a climate necessity or an EU requirement, but should highlight its national economic, social, and environmental benefits. The energy transition should be articulated as an economic modernisation strategy that enhances competitiveness in the medium to long term, while also serving as a route to sustained affordability and energy independence. Furthermore, it should be discussed as a geopolitical safeguard against energy dependencies or coercive trade practices.
6. Institutionalise strategic foresight and scenario planning
To enhance their resilience in a progressively multifaceted geopolitical and energy setting, CEE nations ought to institutionalise strategic foresight and scenario planning as a fundamental component of national policy frameworks. This involves developing independent analytical abilities to foresee impending disruptions, including energy supply chain shocks, changing EU-U.S.-China relations, and climate-related security risks. By incorporating scenario-based policy planning into their strategic framework, CEE governments can more effectively manage uncertainty, align with long-term European energy objectives, and improve their capacity to respond to emerging challenges with agility and coherence.
As Central and Eastern Europe reconfigures its strategic identity within the changing global energy landscape, the region should perceive the clean energy transition not solely as a decarbonization imperative, but as a cornerstone for lasting independence, economic robustness, and geopolitical relevance. The decisions made today—regarding infrastructure investments, supply chain partnerships, or public communication—will determine CEE’s position within the European Union and on the global stage for decades. Utilizing its geographic location, industrial capabilities, and expanding diplomatic influence, the region can serve as a catalyst for Europe’s clean reindustrialization, while simultaneously improving its energy autonomy and social unity.
To achieve this vision, CEE countries must resist short-term financial rewards that prolong dependency and instead strive for a pragmatic yet progressive agenda. This agenda, rooted in regional cooperation and technological diversification, should enhance the region’s capacity to manage geopolitical instability while significantly contributing to the EU’s climate and competitiveness objectives. Only through strategic clarity and collective determination can Central and Eastern Europe convert its vulnerabilities into leadership and agency in the realm of clean energy geopolitics.
